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ABSTRACT:   Synthetic biology, which is a new emerging technology aiming at re-writing existing biological systems and 
designing completely new parts and devices, brings several potential benefits, but at the same time it 
constitutes a new threat to biosecurity: for such “double Janus face”, it can be considered as a “dual use 
research”. Indeed, the risk that its theoretical discoveries and applications are handled by bioterrorists and 
used for malevolent purposes is not a mere hypothesis. Therefore, it is necessary to look for possible 
solutions for the governance of this type of risk. In order to try to achieve such purpose, the analysis 
focuses, first of all, on the overview of the existing regulations against bioterrorism. Then, these 
regulations are evaluated in the light of the constitutional frame of fundamental rights at stake (in the belief 
that any policy/regulation should take into account and be based on the respect of fundamental rights). 
Thirdly, the applicability of the existing regulatory framework to synthetic biology is checked. Fourthly, the 
different positions that have been proposed so far for addressing biosecurity risks in the area of synthetic 
biology are shown and put into comparison. Finally, the proposal of a model of governance, called of 
“prudent vigilance”, is described. 
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1. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: A TYPE OF “DUAL USE RESEARCH”. 
 
Biosecurity, meant as the whole set of measures and efforts that are to be taken and needed to prevent the 
creation of deadly pathogens for the purposes of bioterrorism
1
, has become a central and challenging part of 
any global policy-making agenda in the 21
st
 Century, due to the rapid advancement of science and 
technology. Among the threats to biosecurity, there is «a game changing scientific development that 
transcends all in human history. It is already underway and it even has a name: synthetic biology»
2
. With 
Watson’s and Crick’s discovery of double-helix structure of DNA, together with the studies of genetic 
engineering (focused on isolating a single gene and manipulating it), and the analysis of short and long 
pieces of DNA of many organisms (object of attention by molecular biology), the field of science has entered 
into a new era.  It starts from the idea of looking at the whole genome of organisms and takes it a step 
further, going beyond the trying to understand and know the genome to the idea of manipulating it by the 
writing and re-writing the genome. Such a new “revolution” is known as synthetic biology, a discipline that - 
to put it provocatively - seems to be capable of realizing the ancient human dream of being able to create life 
and finding the answer to the mystery that is life. Briefly, it can be defined as a converging science and 
technology that aims at «a) the design and construction of new biological parts (called “building blocks”), 
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 scratched and put together in novel circuits, networks and systems (that are synthetic because they do not 
exist in the natural world), and b) the re-design of existing, natural biological systems for useful purposes»
3
. 
Beyond the potential applications, synthetic biology arises several risks, such as the biosecurity one
4
. 
Indeed, the possibility of creating synthetic viruses having harmful purposes for environment, human and 





. This is demonstrated, for example, by the de novo synthesis of poliovirus
6
 and of the 1918 
Spanish flu
7
. These viruses could be handled by bioterrorists or by “lone operators”, i.e. highly trained 
synthetic biologists with a grudge against someone or an organisation. Such individuals could be 
professional researchers that have access to lab equipments or “garage biologists”
8
, belonging to the Do-It-
Yourself movement (D.I.Y.)
9
. There is also the figure of “biohacker”, who aims at creating virus «out of 
curiosity or to show his technical prowess»
10
. Indeed, the worry that synthetic biology could be used for 
creating new pathogens and viruses is amplified by information technology (IT), which provides open access 
to such information on the Internet, and by the lowering of prices for obtaining technological equipment. In 
addition, beside the risk of malevolent use of biological knowledge by bioterrorists, there is «the concern that 
the knowledge output of synthetic biological research and development could be incorporated into the 
offensive bioweapons programs of Developed States»
11





i.e. the dilemma which arises when scientific knowledge could be used in both good and 
harmful ways, such as for civil purposes (e.g., drugs development, in medical treatment) and military 
purposes (e.g., in the production of bioweapons).The same dilemma occurred within nuclear fission 
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 technology regarding the ethics in usage of that technology. Certainly, “dual use” is an aspect that pertains 
not only to research, but also to the technological application of a research
13
. According to Michael 
Selgelid
14
, though, the threat posed by the misuse of knowledge from synthetic biology will ultimately be 
greater than that posed by nuclear technology: firstly, nuclear technology was and is too expensive for 
common people, while the technologies required to produce bioweapons may become quite portable and 
cheap; secondly, in contrast to nuclear technology, which was kept confidential, the biological field has a 
long tradition of openness in its access to knowledge and sharing of resources.  
As seen, the abuse of synthetic biology in order to create biological weapons could occur by side of 
governments and by single terrorists. Therefore, it is urgent to consider how this new threat could be faced 
with and managed, and what the role of the law in the governance of such risks might be. 
 
 
2. WHERE ARE WE NOW? AN OVERVIEW OF THE EXISTING REGULATIONS AGAINST 
BIOTERRORISM. 
 
Since synthetic biology generates a potential threat to biosecurity, it is of utmost importance to check 
whether the existing regulations in the field of bioterrorism could be applied to cover synthetic biology too, or 
whether a modification of the norms should be boosted. Therefore, an overview of the main regulations at 
stake at the international and European level, and within some national experience is offered hereafter. 
As a premise, it can be observed that the regulations about bioterrorism that have been enacted so far 
pertain to the following fields
15
: 
(1) Criminal law: bioterrorism as a crime and the formulation of sanctions against bioterrorists for possession, 
manufacture, or distribution of bioweapons; the “goods” that are protected by this type of norms are physical 




(2) Public health (and medical) law: norms for preparedness in case of bioterrorist act and response, 
addressed to public health community such as hospitals, laboratory network, medical doctors, health 
professionals, forensic scientists (norms concerning data collection, control of people, such as for 
quarantines, and control of property, such as for decontamination of facilities); 
(3) Emergency management law: norms for preparedness and response to emergency situations; 
(4) National security law: rules for law enforcement communities, such as police, customs agents, 
governments, and so on, with regards to the controlling of transfer and movements of dangerous biological 
agents and toxins, the prevention and the response to bioterrorist attacks. 
 
 
2.1. AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL. 
 
At the international level, the starting point for biosecurity rules can be found in 1925 Geneva Protocol
17
, 
which prohibited the deployment of chemical and biological weapons following the horrible impact of 
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 chemical warfare during the World War I. However, this Protocol mentioned only the ban of developing 
biological weapons, and no reference was made with regards to their production, storage, and transfer
18
. 
With the birth of the first biological weapons programs, the need for more specific rules was perceived as a 
urgency, and this led to the enactment of the 1972 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (B.W.C.)
19
, 
which is still the main instrument in this field, despite it lacking relevant elements.  
Considered as a complement of Geneva Protocol, it contains a lot of provisions, starting with a list of specific 
biological agents (art. 1), and showing the States’ obligations, such as the forbade to “develop, reproduce, 
stockpile, acquire or retain microbial or biological agents or toxins or weapons, equipment or the means of 
disseminating such agents for non-peaceful purposes” (art. 1), “transfer biological weapons to third party 
states or international organisations or assist them, encourage them or induce them to manufacture or 
acquire such weapons” (art. 3), and to allow “these activities in their territory” (art. 4). The Convention 
requires the destruction of existing inventories and delivery devices, and it fosters mutual assistance in case 
a State is attacked by biological weapons. It should be noted that there are no references to specific agents 
or pathogens. This leaves the freedom to the States to decide which ones are the addressed agents. 
Furthermore, there is no ban for the use of those biological agents for therapeutic and civil purposes. The 
States are called upon to implement the issues about (1) the definitions (of toxins, agents, etc.), (2) the 
prohibitions and the penalties (pertaining to the preparation, development, production, acquisition, 
stockpiling, retention, direct or indirect transfers, and use of biological weapons), (3) the jurisdiction, (4) the 
enforcement (through national authorities, laboratories, surveillance bodies, international cooperation), (5) 
the export control, and (6) the biosafety and biosecurity measures. 
This Convention has an unlimited duration, but a series of review conferences were conducted and have 
been held in order to establish (a) compliance procedures (through an organisation or implementing body or 
any other effective means), (b) measures for monitoring national implementation, and (c) mechanisms for 
investigating the alleged violations, since all these aspects were not indicated in the original treaty and the 
provisions of the B.W.C. are so general that they do not provide specific guidance. Yet, these conferences 
(the last one, the 7
th
, occurred in 2011
20
) have failed in resolving the accountability and enforcement 
procedures. In fact, there is a strong resistance (especially within the U.S.A.) against the intrusion of an 
international convention upon national activities. So, a system of verification of B.W.C. and of control of 
application is still lacking, along with excessive vagueness of some dispositions. Other weaknesses of the 
Convention are represented by the fact that its focus does not cover the role of private (non-state) actors, 
such as bioterrorists, and the States’ obligation to take all the necessary measures to prevent any of the 
prohibited activities within their territories does not explicitly state what these measures actually would be.  
In general, the international regulation, as Bassiouni says
21
, has followed two roads, namely: 
(1) the way of international humanitarian law (Geneva Conventions), stating a ban for the use of belligerency 
methods producing high damages to environment and people, and  
(2) the way of multilateral agreements about the control of weapons. In the second category, three types of 
instruments can be found: 
(a) agreements that have a general character, namely the banning of the use of weapons of mass 
destruction weapons (1968 Treaty of non proliferation of nuclear weapons
22
; 1972 B.W.C; 1980 Geneva 
Convention on conventional weapons having indiscriminate effects
23
, and 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention, C.W.C., about the prohibition of chemical weapons
24
); 
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 In reality, the Protocol was anticipated by some Declarations and conventions, such as the Paris Declaration (1856), 
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 (b) treaties which ban the weapons of mass destruction in certain areas: the Antarctic Treaty (Washington 
1959)
25
, the treaty on the prohibition of proofs of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere and submarine 
territories (Moscow 1963)
26
, the Treaty on the activities of States about the exploration of space 
(Washington, London, Moscow 1967)
27
, the treaty on the use of nuclear weapons in the depth of sea and 
ocean (Washington, London, Moscow 1971)
28




(c) the agreements which establish the zones of atomic exclusion (1968 Tlatelolco Treaty
30
; 1985 Raratonga 
Treaty
31
; 1995 South-Eastern Asia Treaty
32
, and the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty
33
). 
The main principles underlying these conventions are that the weapons that generate indiscriminate and 
useless suffering, which are not proportional and not necessary, must be prohibited. These principles usually 
contain a list of prohibited behaviours, and ask the State to develop policies of prevention and to sanction the 
violations.  
In the U.N. system, since 2001, the Security Council focuses its attention on terrorism, as its role is central in 





, the U.N. makes reference to the possibility that terrorists could have access and 
to detain biological materials having lethal functions. The main resolution is the n. 1540/2004
36
, where it is 
stated that all the States of the International Community should introduce national controls in order to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of connected materials, thus 
intensifying international cooperation against fabrication, construction, transport and diffusion of those 
weapons. The focus is posed particularly on non State use of bioweapons. The Resolution also establishes 
the creation of the Committee 1540, which is voted to control the effective application of the Resolution
37
. 
At the international level the initiative of G7 members is relevant as well. In 2001, in Ottawa, the G7 
Ministries of Health (together with the Mexican Secretary of Health and one Member of the European 
Commission, responsible for health and protection of the consumers) created the Global Group of Sanitary 
Action and Security
38
, which aims to organize a coordinate response in cases of bioterrorism. 
Interpol (International Police) also plays a meaningful role here. In 2006, Interpol established a specific 
programme about bioterrorism detailing the implementation of security education, and the legislative norms 
about cooperation. The programme was called “Bio-criminalization” and, through the support of Sloan 
Foundation and the Government of Canada, a Guide on the anticipatory measures and response to 
bioterrorist incidents was published
39
. 
Furthermore, “Australia Group” (A.G.) is «an informal forum of countries which, through the harmonisation of 
export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological 
weapons»
40
. The A.G. maintains Common Control Lists that require controls on the export of certain 
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 The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on 
the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty) was adopted on 11
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th
 December 1995 and entered into force on 27
th
 March 1997. 
33
 The Treaty of Pelindaba is the common name for the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. It was adopted on 
11
th
 April 1996, but is not entered into force yet. 
34
 See Kofi Annan, about U.N. Reform Project, U.N.G.A., In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security and Human 
Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, 21
st
 March 2005, p. 29. 
35
 The U.N. Security Council resolution 1453 was adopted unanimously on 24
th
 December 2002. 
36
 The U.N. Security Council resolution 1540 was adopted unanimously on 28
th
 April 2004. 
37









 July 2001. 
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 biological agents or parts
41
. The list is being implemented through national laws and regulations, but it clearly 
requires the States within the A.G. to regulate exports of such material, and not domestic transfers. The 
additional biosecurity screening of domestic orders and customers by DNA synthesis companies is de facto 
done on a voluntary basis.  
In 2005, the World Health Assembly, the highest decision-making body of W.H.O., adopted a revised set of 
International Health Regulations
42
, which is in force from 2007, and it binds the W.H.O. Member States on an 
opt-out basis. It adopts an “all risk” approach, which includes any emergency with repercussions for 
international health security (outbreaks of epidemic diseases, outbreaks of food, natural disasters, accidental 
or deliberate release of pathogens). It has the purposes of protecting against public health threats, 
controlling and providing adequate response in cases of spread of diseases. The States have to notify 
W.H.O. of events within their territories that may constitute a “public health emergency of international 
concern” and they have to intervene without being invasive or intrusive to people’s lives. 
In the Council of Europe, bioterrorism has been contemplated in Resolution 1367/2004
43
, in which the 
Parliamentary Assembly
44
 asks the States to inform and educate the public about the inherent dangers of 
bioterrorism, to draw up an objective assessment of the potential sources of bioterrorist danger, and 
elaborate on an efficient and effective surveillance and warning systems, to devise emergency intervention 
and public-health relief plans, to frame a suitable public vaccination policy, to control the purchase and 
movement of dangerous substances, and to establish strict control over activities based on the use of 
modern biotechnologies in order to avoid their misuse for bioterrorism.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.) has, over the years, had a 
relevant role in the development of a culture of biosecurity both on the governmental and scientific 
community level. Indeed, it has indicated the importance of common standards of safety in labs
45
 and 
established a Group of Experts on Biosecurity to the Task Force on Biological Resource Centres (2002). 
Moreover, in 2004, the O.E.C.D. International Futures Programme (I.F.P.)
46
, which has been working on risk 
management issues since 2000, conducted a workshop on “Promoting Responsible Stewardship in the 





2.2.  AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL. 
 
The first list of biological agents enacted by the E.U. is contained in the Directive 90/679
48
. 
Regarding the export of technological material of “double use”, the Regulation n. 1334/2000 establishes a 
regime of control of exports and transfer
49
, and it contains a list of biological and chemical agents that are to 
be subjected to strict measures of check and authorization by Member States before export (as indicated in 
Annex I). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, and the European Community Commission (Observer).  
41
 Australia Group, List of Biological Agents for Export Control, http://www.australia group.net/en/biologicalagents.html, 
2006. The control list refers to: genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of 
any of the microorganisms in the list; genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins in 
the list, or for their sub-units; genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the 
pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list; and genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid 
sequences coding for any of the toxins in the list or for their sub-units. 
42
 International Health Regulations (2005), W.H.A. Res. 58.3, 23
rd
 May 2005. 
43
 Resolution 1367 (2004), adopted by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 2
nd
 March 2004. 
44
 See also the Doc. 10095, 17
th
 February 2004, Bio-terrorism: a serious threat for citizens’ health, Opinion
 
by the 
Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs, where the possibility of terrorist use, not only 
of known natural pathogens but also of synthetic biological agents produced for peaceful purposes, is mentioned.  
Moreover, see the Report by Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee (9
th
 February 2004). 
45
 See the publication of the reports: Biological Resource Centres: Underpinning the Future of Life Sciences and 
Biotechnology, 2001, and Best Practices for Biosecurity in Biological Resource Centres, 2007. 
46
 See at http://www.oecd.org/futures/long-termtechnologicalsocietalchallenges/33855561.pdf. 
47
 For deepening the role of O.E.C.D. in biosecurity, see SAWAYA, David B., “Biosecurity at the OECD”, Biosecurity 
Origins, Transformations and Practices, RAPPERT, Brian / GOULD, Chandr (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, England, 2009, p. 
79 ff. 
48
 Council Directive 90/679/EEC of 26
th
 November 1990 on the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to 
biological agents at work, in O.J. L 374/1990. 
49
 See Regulation 1334/2000 of 22
nd
 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use 
items and technology in O.J. L 159/2000, modified by Regulation 2432/2001 of 20
th
 November 2001 in O.J. L 338/2001, 
and by Regulation 428/2009 of 5
th
 May 2009 in O.J. L 134/2009. 
 Since 2001, the European Union has started worrying about anthrax cases after the events that occurred in 
the United States in the aftermath of 9/11
50
. Such events generated the necessity of adopting preventative 
measures in the sanitary field, in order to protect the people from the risks to their health and security. The 
E.U. also instituted a network of information for a rapid response to threats, a policy of vaccination and 
cooperation in the management of risks
51
.  
Following a chronological order analysis, in 2001, the Committee of Sanitary Security was established 
(formed of the highest members of health coming from different E.U. States), with the duty to ensure the 
adequate coordination between security and health agencies within the E.U., to share knowledge and 
information through the establishment of an alert mechanism, to cooperate and approve a programme of 
preparedness and response in case of attacks with chemical and biological agents (programme BICHAT)
52
. 
This programme fostered (a) the creation of a database including medical, sanitary and pharmaceutical data 
that could be useful in case of attack, a list of national reservation of antibiotics and vaccines (currently not 
yet in existence), and a list of medical experts in the hypothesis of an attack, and (b) the elaboration of 
norms and codes of conduct to be adopted in case of threat. 
A system of rapid alarm for signalling cases of propagation of harmful biological agents became operative 
since 2002 (called RAS-BICHAT, Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats). It 
connected the members of the Committee of Sanitary Security and the contact points at national level, and it 
was aimed at ensuring controls and emergency responses. 
Interventions in the sector of civil protection were also designed as a means for ensuring sanitary security, in 
a cooperative way among the States
53
. 
Moreover, a “Guidance document on use of medicinal products for treatment and prophylaxis of biological 
agents that might be used as weapons of bioterrorism”
54
 was enacted by the European Medical Agency and 
its Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (C.P.M.P.), on the E.U. Commission’s request, to describe 
the most used agents of bioterrorism and list the possible drugs that might be useful in the case of an attack. 
A Working Group on Bioterrorism and some Task Forces were established, such as (a) a Task Force with 
Commission and States members about C.B.R.N. (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) protection, 
(b) a Task Force Commission-Pharmaceutical Industries, (c) a Task Force Commission-Research chiefs, 
and (d) a Research and Development Expert Group on Countering the Effects of Biological and Chemical 
Terrorism. Again in 2002, the Council and the Commission, jointly, elaborated on a C.B.R.N. Terrorism 
Programme
55
, in order to improve the cooperation in the E.U. for the prevention and limitation of the 
consequences of terrorist threats.  
In 2003, the Commission drafted a Communication to the Council and Parliament about the cooperation 
within the E.U. regarding the preparation and response in case of attacks with chemical and biological 
agents
56
, including all the measures to be adopted (in pharmaceutical, public health, surveillance areas). 
In the same year, the E.U. Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery, known as the E.U. W.M.D. strategy, was adopted by the European Council
57
. The European 
Council reviewed it through the adoption of “New lines for action by the European Union in combating the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems” (December 2008)
58
. In addition, 
since 2003, W.M.D. clauses were inserted in all new or renewed mixed agreements with third countries.  
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 About the summary of all the initiatives of the E.U. In the field of bioterrorism, see at http://ec.europa.eu/health-
eu/my_environment/bio_terrorism/index_en.htm. 
51
 In reality since 1998, Decision 2119/98 (24
th 
September 1998 in O.J. L 268/1998) focused on the surveillance of 
transmissible diseases, stressing the importance of monitoring infective diseases and activating rapid responses all over 
Europe, also creating an EU network of communicable diseases. 
52
 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “On Cooperation in the 
European Union on Preparedness and Response to Biological and Chemical Attacks”, COM (2003) 320, 2
nd
 June 2003. 
53
 See Communications of the Commission COM (2001) 707 def. and COM (2002) 302 def.; Council Decision 
2007/779/EC, establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism and Council Decision establishing a Civil Protection 
Financial Instrument (2007/162/EC).  
54
 EMEA/CPMP/4048/01, Guidance document on use of medicinal products for treatment and prophylaxis of biological 
agents that might be used as weapons of bioterrorism, London, 25
th
 July 2002. 
55
  14627/02, C.B.R.N. Programme to improve cooperation in the European Union for preventing and limiting the 
consequences of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorist threats. 
56
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “On Cooperation in the European 
Union on Preparedness and Response to Biological and Chemical Attacks”, COM (2003) 320, 2
nd
 June 2003. 
57
 15708/03 and SN 400/03, n. 68, E.U. Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (W.M.D.) adopted 
by the European Council on 12
th




 December 2008, Council Conclusions and new lines for action by the European Union in combating the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. 
 Then, in 2005, a Communication
59
 about the coordination of sanitary emergency intervention and one about 
the establishment of a general rapid alert system called “ARGUS”
60
 for multisector crisis were enacted. 
In 2007, a “Green Book on Biopreparedness about the preparation in case of biological attack”
61
 was 
released, in order to introduce a process of consultation for the reduction of biological risks, and thus 
underlining the need to build up a strong culture of awareness among scientific community. The Green Book 
received over 80 responses, all of which agreed with the importance of tackling the issue of biosecurity at the 
European level. Thus, this indicates the E.U.’s central role in co-ordinating the biopreparedness of its 
Member States according to an “all hazards” approach, which involves the police and judicial bodies, health 
and civil protection services
62
. 
The Commission also elaborated on a system of medical information (called “MediSys”) that assembles 
information about sanitation and methods for treating epidemics, even in emergency contexts. With a “White 
Book on health policies for the period 2008-2013”
63
, the Commission clarifies the need for a consideration of 
the benefits of new technologies on health and, at the same time, a need for progressing in the development 
of measures to respond to health pandemic risks, such as bioterrorism.  
In 2006, a Council Joint Action in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was adopted
64
, in 
order to promote the universality of B.W.C. and support for implementation of the B.W.C. by States Parties. 
In 2009, the Action Plan, which was put in force to strengthen the C.B.R.N. Programme, was enucleated by 
the Commission
65
. It presented an “all hazard” approach, focusing on the prevention, preparation, detection 
and response against threats, which is to be applied through cooperation among the States, and the use of 
E.U. mechanisms  (such as contacting E.U. civil protection, the Committee of Sanitary Security, the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, located in Stockholm and instituted by Regulation 
851/2004). However, such C.B.R.N. Action Plan is not a legal instrument, and so the implementation of it 
would be required by future instruments.  
 
 
2.3. IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
The attention by the U.S.A. towards biosecurity as threatened by new technologies can be seen since the 
years 1974 and 1975, when the concerns over the safe and ethical manipulation of genetic material using 
recombinant DNA techniques emerged at the Asilomar Conference
66
. On that occasion, the members of 
scientific community claimed self-governance for biotechnology, and drafted a set of voluntary guidelines 
that restricted recombinant DNA research to the K12 strain of E. coli, which was believed to be disabled from 
generations of use in the laboratory and to be not likely to survive in the environment.  
In response to the same fears, the National Institute of Health established the Recombinant DNA Advisory 
Committee (R.A.C.) in 1974
67
. The R.A.C. was first charged by the N.I.H. to develop a set of guidelines for 
the safe conduct of recombinant DNA research, which were issued in 1976 as the “N.I.H. Guidelines for 
Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules”. The N.I.H. also required the creation of an Institutional 
Biosafety Committee (I.B.C.) at each funded research institution. 
Concerns were also raised with respect to academic freedom and the freedom of research, and in this 
regard the 1982 Corson Report was enacted, followed in 1985 by the National Security Decision Directive n. 
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 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
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 White paper - Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008-2013 {SEC(2007) 1374} {SEC(2007) 1375} 
{SEC(2007) 1376}, COM 630/2007, 23
rd
 October 2007. 
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 Council Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP of 27
th
  February 2006 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 





 June 2009. See also SEC (2009) 874, Commission Staff Working Document, entitled “Bridging Security 
and Health: Towards the identification of good practices in the response to CBRN incidents and the security of CBR 
substances”, accompanying the Communication of Commission “Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 
Nuclear Security in the European Union”. 
66
 See BERG, Paul et al., “Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules”, Science, No. 4148, Vol. 185, 1974, pp. 
303 ff.; BERG, Paul et al., “Summary Statement of the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA”, Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the U.S.A., No. 6, Vol. 72, 1975, pp. 1981-1984. 
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 See http://oba.od.nih.gov/rdna_rac/rac_about.html. 
 189 (N.S.D.D. n.189). The Corson report
68
 was drafted by the National Academy of Sciences, and it stated 
that it was not necessary to restrict research and international scientific communication, as the censorship or 
secrecy would have weakened U.S. technological development. Directive 189
69
, then, fixed the national 
policy for controlling the flow of scientific and technology information generated in universities and 
laboratories, by supporting the openness of scientific inquiry, including the right to pursue and publish, 
without government restrictions, all the research and placing the onus on the scientific community to regulate 
itself.  




After the anthrax attacks of October 2001, Congress took a series of legislative actions
71
 directed at securing 
potentially dangerous biological agents, including the 2001 Patriot Act, and the 2002 Public Health Security 
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act.  
The Patriot Act
72
 determines the case of “possession” of select agents for the first time (Section 817), 
establishing the possession standards for bona fide research and requiring assurances from research 
institutions that no “restricted persons” could have access to such select agent research. The Patriot Act 
makes it illegal for anyone in the United States to possess any biological agent, including any genetically 
engineered organism, for any inappropriate reason
73
. 
The second statute, i.e. the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
74
, adds 
new requirements for the listing of potentially dangerous biological agents and the prevention of unlawful 
access to agents during transfers. It requires that all persons possessing biological agents or toxins deemed 
a threat to public health to notify the Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services (D.H.H.S.). The 
U.S. Department of Agriculture is called for regulating toxins and biological agents posing threats to plants 
and animals. The Act also establishes penalties for those failing to notify the proper authorities about the 
possession of select agents (registered in the National Select Agents Registry)
75
. 
In 2004, in addition to prohibiting possession and transportation of material, the U.S. restricted the use of 
synthesis technology to produce one specific pathogen. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 




In the same years (2004-2005), the U.S. Congress passed the Project Bioshield Act
77
, which provided $5 
billion for vaccines in case of a bioterrorist event, and the Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug 
Development Act (“Bioshield 2”)
78
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 September 1985, National Policy On The Transfer Of Scientific, Technical And Engineering 
Information. 
70
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th
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months for possession of a toxin (Tetrodotoxin) with intent to use it as a weapon. 
71
 For a review of all the legislative framework about bioterrorism in the U.S.A., see RICHARDS, Edward P. / O’BRIEN, Terry 
/ RATHBUN, Katharine C., “Bioterrorism and the Use of Fear in Public Health”, The Urban Lawyer, No. 3, Vol. 34, 2002, 
pp. 685-726. 
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 115 Stat. 272 (2001), signed on 26
th
 October 2001 and effective since 1
st
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73
 Two meaningful applications of the Patriot Act were in (a) the case of a graduate student in Connecticut, who was 
charged with violations of the Patriot Act because he did not possess the anthrax for bona fide research (he was found to 
own two vials of anthrax from a 1960 cow necropsy) and (b) the case of a researcher at Texas Tech University (Dr. 
Thomas Butler), who was convicted of mislabelling plague samples being shipped from overseas. 
74
 The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (the Bioterrorism Act) was 
signed into law on 12
th
 June 2002. 
75
 About the U.S. legislation, see BUCHSBAUM, Lori L., “The U.S. Public Health Response To Bioterrorism: Need For A 
Stronger Legislative Approach”, Journal Of Medicine And Law, No. 1, Vol. 7, 2002, pp. 2-36. 
76





 The Project Bioshield Act, whose full name is “An Act To amend the Public Health Service Act to provide protections 
and countermeasures against chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents that may be used in a terrorist attack against the 
United States by giving the National Institutes of Health contracting flexibility, infrastructure improvements, and 
expediting the scientific peer review process, and streamlining the Food and Drug Administration approval process of 
countermeasures” (118 Stat. 835–864), was signed on 21
st
 July 2004. 
78
 The Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2005, nicknamed “Bioshield Two”, is the Act S. 
1873/2005. 
79
 About the Project Bioshield I and II, see MAYER, Lincoln P., “Immunity For Immunizations: Tort Liability, Biodefense, 
And Bioshield II”, Stanford Law Review, No. 6, Vol. 59, 2007, pp. 1753-1790. 
 With regards to the control of movement of pathogenic biological agents, the main regulation is the Export 
Administration Regulations (E.A.R.)
80
. It was enacted to implement the 1979 Export Administration Act which 
confers legal authority to the President for controlling the U.S. exports for reasons of public national security. 
The U.S. Department for Commerce is the actor called for implementing E.A.R., and since then it has 
provided a list of substances to be controlled (such as microorganisms, viruses, bacteria, toxins) and license 
requirements, which differ from each State of the U.S.. 
While the international orders are regulated by E.A.R., the internal ones follow Select Agent Regulation 
(S.A.R.)
81
, which was endorsed in 2005 for implementing the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act. This results in the notification required by people possessing those agents 
to be more specified, the deepening the role of D.H.H.S. in listing biological agents and toxins, and the 
approval of the safety measures, the containment and response plan to accidents developed by labs, in 
order to confer the certificate of registration that has three years validity. 
Regarding the preparedness and response against bioterrorism, the Centre for Disease Control and 
Prevention (C.D.C.) has a meaningful role in alerting the emergency
82
. In 2001, it drafted a Model State 
Emergency Health Powers Act (M.S.E.H.P.A.)
83
 and, in 2009, the United States developed their first National 
Health Security Strategy
84
, which offers a response for cases of natural disasters, naturally-occurring 
infectious disease epidemics and bioterrorism, and focuses on the preparedness, planning, surveillance, 
people protection, communication and public information. Coercive public health powers can be exercised 
only after the governor has declared a state of emergency, and public health officials can carry out 
examinations necessary for diagnosis and treatment, and conduct isolation and quarantine when they aim to 
prevent a substantial risk of transmission of infection. However, they must adhere to human rights principles, 
adopting the least restrictive alternative, and safe measures. Moreover, the C.D.C. has the authority to 
control and monitor the possession, use and transfer of select agents and toxins. 
The Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act
85
, enacted in 2006 to improve the organization, direction, 
and utility of preparedness efforts, has centralised federal responsibilities, and proposed new national 
surveillance methods, by placing the Department of Health and Human Services (D.H.H.S.) as the lead 
agency for federal public health and medical response to public health emergencies covered by the National 
Response Plan. It also focuses on volunteers for the oversight, through the Emergency System for Advance 
Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (E.S.A.R.-V.H.P.) and Medical Reserve Corps (M.R.C.). The 
Act establishes a new Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (B.A.R.D.A.) within the 
D.H.H.S. which is charged with fostering collaboration, supporting research, and encouraging innovation. 
 
 
2.4.  IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. 
 
The U.K’s attention on bioterrorism began in 2001 and intensified after London bombings on 7
th
 July 2005.  
In general, the current legislation in the U.K. in relation to terrorism is represented by the 2000 Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act
86
, the 2000 Terrorism Act
87
, the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
88
, the 
2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act
89
, the 2006 Terrorism Act
90
, and the 2008 Counter Terrorism Act
91
. With 
regards to emergency response to health threats, the 1984 Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act
92
 and the 
2004 Civil Contingencies Act
93
 and could be applied. 
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 With regards to the U.K. legislations, see at http://www.legislation.gov.uk. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000 (R.I.P. or R.I.P.A.) was approved on 28
th
 July 2000. 
87
 The Terrorism Act was approved on 20
th
 July 2000. 
88
 The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act came into force on 14
th
 December 2001. 
89
 The Prevention of Terrorism Act was approved on 11
th
 March 2005. 
90
 The Terrorism Act was approved on 30
th
 March 2006. 
91
 The Counter Terrorism Act was approved on 26
th
 November 2008. 
92
 The Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act was approved on 26
th
 June 1984. 
93
 The Civil Contingencies Act was approved on 18
th
 November 2004. 
 In response to the threat of bioterrorism, section 113 of the 2001 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 
concerning the “Use of noxious substances or things to cause harm and intimidate”, indicates the different 
hypothesis of crimes of bioterrorism. Part 6 of the same statute amends the Biological Weapons Act 1974, 
which gave application to B.W.C.. A meaningful reference is given to private actors that operate for 
bioterrorist purposes (section 43). Then, in case that someone keeps or uses biological agents or toxins, 
he/she is charged with: (1) the duty of notification to the Secretary of State before any dangerous substance 
is kept or used, (2) the duty of notifying, on demand, the police about the security provisions for those 
substances, (3) the duty to identify, within one month of the service of the notice, those having access to 
such substances, where the substances are kept or the building and site where are located, and (4) the duty 
to give directions to disposal of such substances by others. These measures are accompanied by powers of 
entry and search warrants, and offences relating to the security of pathogens and toxins. Schedule 5 of the 
Act sets out a list of pathogens and toxins
94
. The Secretary of State has the possibility to extend the list to 
include further pathogens or toxins if suspected of being used for bioterrorism
95
; then, he/she could specify 
the manner and time in which the substances must be disposed of (section 63), and prevent a particular 
individual from having access to the substance (section 64). 
The 2002 Export Control Act
96
 also allows the Secretary of State to make provision for the imposition of 
transfer controls in relation to suspected technology, but he cannot make a control order, having the effect of 
interfering with the communication of information in the ordinary course of scientific research. 
With regards to preparedness and response to bioterrorism, the Cabinet Office (aimed at co-ordinating the 
operation of government departments
97
) deals with the so-called “U.K. Resilience” by indicating two areas 
within it: the “Emergency Preparedness” and the “Emergency Response and Recovery”
98
, which are 
governed in part by the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act.  
The general responsibility of counter-terrorism and planning and organization in emergencies is vested on 
the Home Office
99
. The U.K. Government has published its strategy for countering international terrorism 
(named CONSENT) in the document “Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for 
Countering International Terrorism”
100
, where a reference to “Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
weapons, and explosives” is given in Part 2. The CONSENT strategy is overseen at a Ministerial level by the 
Cabinet Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (N.S.I.D.), chaired by the 
Prime Minister, and by the Home Secretary as the lead Minister for counter-terrorism, and it involves the 
heads of the security and intelligence agencies, the police, and Armed Forces. Other public authorities are 
also involved, such as the Cabinet Office, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, the Association of Chief 
Police Officers and Local Authorities.  
In relation to health implications, the Health Protection Agency
101
, created under the 2004 Health Protection 
Agency Act
102
, plays a role in bioterrorism responses
103
. The Agency is articulated into three research 
centres: the Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, the Centre for Infections, and the Centre 
for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards. Physicians are also under a general duty to report 
incidences of communicable or infectious diseases (under the 1984 Public Health (Control of Disease) 
Act
104
). There is also a surveillance strategy, which provides the examination, hospitalization and detention 
of an individual who has or is suspected to have a listed disease, and the regulations extend to measures to 
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 2.5. IN ITALY. 
 
In Italy, specific norms are not in place with regards to bioterrorism attack, except the Law that ratifies the 
B.W.C.
106
. There are only references to terrorism (such as in the Law n. 438/2001 and Law n. 155/2005, 
coming from the Law Decree n. 144/2005 and giving application to the Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism).  
However, single pieces of legislation cover this issue, such as a new norm that has been introduced in 2005 
within the Criminal Code, about the possession and misuse of biological agents (art. 270 quinquies). This 
provision is aimed at prosecuting those who give instructions about the preparation and utilization of 
dangerous chemical or batteriological substances.  
The control of the import, export and transit of dual use materials is left upon the Ministry of Productive 
Activities (Department for the Internationalization). A Decree of  this Ministry (4
th
 August 2003) has classified 




Furthermore, the National Committee for Biosafety, Biotechnology and Life Sciences has been created and, 
within it, a Working Group for Biosafety and Bioterrorism, which has the purpose of enacting a “Code of 
conduct for the dual use products”
108
. Such Code has been released in 2010, and it recommends that (1) a 
culture of responsibility and awareness should be developed among scientists about the risks connected 
with their research, (2) laboratories of high risk should be monitored and controlled, (3) the Ministry of Health 
and Agriculture should authorize detention and importation of agents, (4) programmes of formation and 
education of scientists should be pursued, and (5) participation at international networks for biosecurity is 
essential. 
The control of laboratories has a central importance. Indeed, laboratories that respect the “Labs Good 
Practice” will receive a certificate of conformity by the Ministry of Health
109
. Moreover, a system of control 
and inspection of those centres has been shaped
110
. In each centre the level of risk should be determined 
(from 1 to 4) and, on the basis of it, the type of containment is taken. 




, and environmental protection
113
, establish 
systems of traceability, control and compliance as well. 
With reference to response measures, in 2001 a set of guidelines as “Emergency National Plan against 
biological, chemical and radiological terrorist attacks” has been drafted by Ministry of Health and Ministry of 
Inner Affairs. In the light of a bioterrorist attack, a Crisis Unity should intervene, along with some Centres for 
Counselling and Support in all national territory.  Regional and local entities should be involved as well. For 
the Rapid Alert System, a Police Unity for Health Protection has been chosen as the National Contact Point. 
Military Specialized forces must intervene in case of attack and work in collaboration with civilian Authorities. 
Then, police, civilian authorities and health bodies are involved in response to bioterrorism, and they are 
coordinated and supported by the National Centre for Diseases Prevention and Control
114
.  
Moreover, according to the “National Defence Program - Health Sector”, measures of risk contention are 
presented. Two Centres (the “Spallanzani” Hospital in Rome and the “Sacco” Hospital in Milan) have to deal 
with clinic management of the crisis and for coordination of measures, while the Institute of Health must deal 
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 3. HOW TO DRAW A SOLID REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AGAINST BIOTERRORISM? THE 
IMPORTANCE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. 
 
After considering the existing regulations about bioterrorism, it is important to check whether they are in line 
with the respect of fundamental rights. In my view, indeed, the “constitutional” framework (meant, in a broad 
sense, as all the bills of fundamental rights that are settled at the highest level of the hierarchy of sources of 
law within “Civil Law” systems, or as the set of human rights that are part of the constitutional - even non 
written – tradition, especially within “Common Law” systems) ought to be at the basis of any regulation, from 
the statutory level up to the level of the codes of conduct. So, before evaluating the possibility of applying the 
aforementioned regulations to synthetic biology or not, it is necessary to check their compliance with 
fundamental rights that represent the way for building a solid regulation of the matter. 
 
 
3.1. THE RIGHT TO SECURITY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS: 
PROPORTIONALITY AND REASONABLENESS. 
 
When discussing about bioterrorism and biosecurity, the question lies in the type of rights that needed to be 
considered and the method in which to shape a constitutional frame to address them. 
Fundamentally, the regulation against bioterrorism aims to protect human health of populations (in the form 
of life and integrity of single individuals belonging to the community), to the point that it could be rational to 
conceive the existence of a “right to security”
115
, which entails that all these aspects of public health are to be 
safeguarded. In this area, it is evident that the right to security acquires a legal status that is «in part 
autonomous – as a right to a protected existence, indispensable for the enjoyment of other rights vested into 
the subject – and in part indirect, in the sense that it is complementary to other rights, i.e. [...] rooted in the 
notion of quality and wellbeing of individual and collective life. Therefore, security can be qualified as a good 
intrinsically linked to life, physical integrity, well being, and quality of existence and dignity of person. From 
this, it comes out that it can be recognised as a right vested upon the State, in the form of interest to 
guarantee a situation of social peace, and as a right vested upon each individual [...]»
116
. 
So, in deciding how to regulate bioterrorism, public health and security needs are central in both the 
prevention and response phases, but the very core issue is whether such rights to health and security should 
prevail over other rights and the need to “suspend” them for security reasons. Indeed, in the light of a 
bioterrorist attack, the tendency to make security overcome any other rights is strong. The relationship 
between security and other rights in “normal” conditions would be one of “cohabitation” among the rights. 
Here, security would have to promote other rights and be at the basis of the enjoyment of them or at least be 
complementary to them. In “emergency” conditions, instead, like the one of bioterrorism, such a relationship 
risks becoming one in which only security survives and other rights are suppressed.  
For instance, the imposition of vaccines and quarantine for bioterrorism prevention risks to suppress the 
individual right to refusal of treatments. The manner in which to manage to relate public health needs and the 
individual right to health (whose protection entails self-determination and the right to refusal of treatments) 
must be dealt with. 
Moreover, security reasons could be used to stifle the freedom of scientific research. Indeed, the freedom to 
investigate some issues that could provoke a malevolent use (even for bioterrorism, such as research about 
synthetic biology) could be suppressed in the name of protecting security. 
So, in presence of the risks of bioterrorism, the trend would be for security to be the dominant value that 
justifies the “sacrifices” of other human rights and freedoms. In fact, «there is reason to think that as a 
general matter in times of crisis, we will overestimate our security needs and discount the value of liberty»
117
. 
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 This view, though, would alter the set of human rights and, as affirmed by many authors
118
, even in 
emergency situations, human rights cannot be suppressed. Eventual limitations of rights could be admitted 
because of security, but not up to the point of “deleting” some rights and, however, on the basis of some 
rules. The principle of proportionality and of reasonableness seem the most suitable ones to be recalled 
here. They should be used for drawing the balance between security and other rights, such as the individual 
right to health and the freedom of scientific research that are at stake in cases of bioterrorism. As known, the 
principle of proportionality allows a limitation of rights only for temporary periods, for necessity reasons, and 
using the least restrictive means for doing it
119
. In this way, the “core nucleus” of rights is never suppressed 
and its limitations are established in a way that is proportionate to the aim to be pursued (i.e., for protecting 




In doing so, security cannot become an instrument for legitimising public powers to suppress any right. 
Instead, even in conditions of emergency, it cannot annul other rights, but only limit them for short periods of 
time in a proportioned and balanced manner
121
. As Ridola says, the growing needs of security, in relationship 
to new technologies as well, must find «orienteering lines in the constitutional frame»
122
: indeed, «rather than 





3.2. THE BALANCE BETWEEN SECURITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO HEALTH. 
 
In a concrete sense, the balance between security/public health and the individual right to health
124
, which 
includes the right to refusal of treatments (such as the vaccines for contagious diseases determined by 
biological agents), ought to be done in such a way to «permit public health officials to quarantine individuals 
who have a serious communicable disease who either cannot or will not accept treatment for it or agree to 
stay in their home, and who threaten to infect others with it [...]. Even then, however, we require public 
officials to use the “least restrictive alternative” and resort to quarantine only after other interventions, such 
as directly observed therapy, have failed»
125
. In this way, individual consent to treatments should always be 
asked in principle, but when compulsory treatments are required, they should follow the principle of 
proportionality, so that the absence of asking consent can be imposed only in a state of necessity and 
emergency, to people that are really dangerous (i.e., pose a significant risk of transmission of disease), for a 
temporary time and provided that it is shaped as the least restrictive possibility
126
. Moreover, they should 
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 never trump the respect of human dignity, as stated, for instance, in the Italian Constitution (art. 32). In the 
situation of bioterrorism, therefore, public health powers should be exercised without suppressing civil 




3.3. SECURITY AND THE FREEDOM OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: CENSORSHIP OR PUBLICATION?, 
AND OTHER MEANS FOR A BALANCE. 
 
Looking at the relationship between public health/security and the freedom of scientific research, in this case 
the principle of proportionality and reasonableness should be adopted as well. 
Scientific research and discoveries could have harmful effects, because they could be used for bioterrorist 
purposes. Therefore, the need to find how and where to draw the line among admitted research must be 
fixed. In the light of the principle of proportionality, the nucleus of the freedom of research should be left 
untouched, and it coincides with the right to choose the topics of investigation and to exercise theoretical 
speculations. However, when such theory meets the executive phase (i.e., the spread of research results) 
and the application phase (such as the use of synthetic biology for developing bioterrorist applications), the 
freedom of research should be limited in a balanced way. In the case of bioterrorism, though, the distinction 
between research and its products is not so clear because even a “mere” discovery could be interesting for a 
bioterrorist
127
. This touches the core of “dual use dilemma”. Indeed, considering that science could be used 
for malevolent or benevolent purposes, the question now lies in the method to control its diffusion. In other 
words, the main question is the following: is there a need to apply censorship or open access, in the light that 
the same discoveries that could generate bioweapons could also produce drugs and medicines? For 
instance, in the case of the accidental production of a superstrain of mousepox by Australian scientists, they 
decided to publish their research in the Journal of Virology
128
 and later in the U.S. New Scientist
129
 reported 
the same experiment. This was just one case that gave rise to the issue of the regulation of scientific 
research in comparison to security needs. The same happened, more recently, with the case of the possible 
publication of 5 variations to the virus of influenza H5N1, that have been produced at the Erasmus Medical 




According to one position, the publication could be useful in order to make the people know of the existence 
of bioweapons and their risks, and in order to prepare an adequate response to bioterrorism. In this view, 
censorship would limit research and would represent an infringement to the freedom of research
131
. On 
others’ perspective, censorship would be a better option, as the spread of such “sensitive” information that 
could be misused by malevolent people is a danger in itself
132
. 
As Selgelid states, «scientific openness and the progress of medicine matter, but security matters, too. 
There is no reason to give absolute priority to the former over the latter; rather, a balance must be struck 
between the two»
133
, and such balance must be done, according to him, through an evaluation of potential 
(but tangible and not merely imagined) harms and (tangible) potential benefits. If the harms outweigh 
benefits, it would be better to opt for censorship. Otherwise, the open access could be admitted. Of course, 
such a position could be criticized in the sense that, in a context of an uncertainty about benefits and harms 
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 as the one of new technologies, it is difficult to imagine what the benevolent and malevolent effects of it 
could be, and so the cases for censorship and publication are vague and fuzzy to determine and it would 
leave the place to arbitrariness. Nevertheless, it seems to me that this solution is the most rational one and 
the most proper for respecting the proportionality and reasonableness principles. So, the restriction of 
freedom of research for security reasons should be shaped only after a balance between benefits and 
harms, in presence of real threats and when other alternatives do not occur for protecting security. Such 
position of “reasonable balance” between benefits and harms looks like a utilitarian one, from the ethical 
point of view, following a cost-benefits scheme, and it certainly is. However, it can cohabit with other views, 
as Miller and Selgelid explain. The balance to pursue can be framed in utilitarian terms, in deontological 




Such balance seems to be applied in the case of the research about the mutation of virus H5N1. Indeed, 
after the big debate about censorship or publication of the results of the study, the publication was admitted. 
Such an evaluation between benefits and risks led to prefer the spread of knowledge, in order to allow 
researchers to have access of data for realising methods for fighting against H5N1. However, a narrow 
censorship of some methods that were adopted for reaching the results was applied
135
.    
Beyond the aspect of censorship or publication of research results, there are other ways to balance the 
freedom of research with the right to security, without hindering progress and studies and at the same time 
protecting public health. This can be achieved through the establishment of controls to research, through a 
periodic assessment of how research is going on and of biosecurity measures, the screening of orders of 
biological materials by scientists or other people working in the area (such as Do-It-Yourself members), the 
control of access, transport, the export of “sensitive” materials (such as some virus strains), the registration 





4. ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING REGULATIONS AGAINST BIOTERRORISM ON THE BASIS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAME AND THEIR POSSIBLE APPLICABILITY TO SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY. 
 
From the regulatory “landscape” individuated above at the international, European and national level, it 
follows that the constitutional frame that should be taken into account has been, more or less, respected, 
even if some gaps remain.  
All the mentioned regulations try to limit the spread by State and non State actors of organisms, genetic 
elements and toxins that have already been defined as hazardous, but there are no references or very little 
attention to the possibility of creating new genetic agents and biological weapons though synthetic biology. 
The definitions of biological agents, toxins and genetic elements are quite the same in the international, 
European and national legislature. As a result, a sort of harmonization and common standard has been 
reached. 
However, the possibility of extending those regulations to synthetic biology is not so automatic. For instance, 
the B.W.C. refers to agents that are obtained by chemical synthesis, and in doing so, it seems to “cover” the 
developments of genetic modification and the creation of artificial life forms as well
137
, as the “Additional 
Understanding of art. 1” explains. The B.W.C., indeed, «unequivocally covers all microbial or other biological 
agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as well as their components, whatever their origin 
or method of production».  Such a chemical synthesis, though, must lead to the production of already 
controlled toxins and agents or, at least, to agents having a structure that is identical to, or similar to the one 
of known agents. So, only one type of synthetic biology seems to be included (the one of re-designing 
biological structures). It should be noted that it is not the one working with DNA sequences that code for 
novel organisms, toxins and pathogens. The same provisions are given by the Australia Group, whose rules 
cover genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for the toxins in the list (not 
coding for new ones). 
Other problematic “extensions” to synthetic biology could be individuated again in the B.W.C. provisions, 
where the Convention refers only to malevolent use of bioweapons by States, not mentioning non state 
actors, such as the “lone operators” or “biohackers” or bioterrorists not belonging to States. Such imprecision 
is problematic with regards to synthetic biology, which is becoming a field where private enterprises have a 
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Moreover, synthetic biology challenges the Convention, in the part in which B.W.C. focuses only to control of 
the materials, without quoting the control to the access to information and knowledge. 
Then, the U.N. Resolution 1540/2004 does not contain any reference to materials obtained through DNA 
technologies and manipulation (genetic engineering), and so synthetic biology could not be, at present, 
regulated by it.  
In the Council of Europe, the openness to changes determined by new technologies and by the development 
of biology and genetics is mentioned within biosecurity regulations, but it is a vague reference.  
With regards to E.U. regulation, it can be observed that toxins are not covered by the routine epidemiological 
surveillance and the early warning and response system provided by the Decision 2119/98 (that deals only 
with communicable diseases). Moreover, some new agents could be introduced but they would not be 
covered by legislation. The model of preparedness and response is in line with the constitutional frame and 
with the suggested balance of rights. However, this model should be implemented with (a) a system of 
licensing for the possession of instruments used in biological research and a registry of people working 
within the biodefence usage of synthetic biology, (b) the definition of criteria for the publication of data on 
highly pathogenic viruses or toxic agents at Member State and E.U. level, and (c) the creation of a 
centralised database at least at E.U. level, or preferably at international level, where all DNA synthesisers 
would be registered by competent Authorities
139
. Moreover, the Database Directive
140
 should be applied for 
regulating databases where sequences of DNA for synthesis are screened.  
Looking at the U.S.A. model, it could be observed that the Export Administration Regulation and Select 
Agent Regulation contemplate the awareness that DNA could be modified for creating toxins or other 
hazardous biological agents or the hypothesis that GMOs contain genetic sequences carrying on pathogenic 
features. However, such regulations aim to control DNA sequences that are modified to be malevolent, 
provided they are similar to the already existing and controlled organisms and toxins. As highlighted in the 
previous sections, this entails that a lot of fields within synthetic biology are not covered by most of U.S. 
legislation. The only exception is the Patriot Act, which carries with it criminal and civil penalties for those 
who possess biological agents that cannot be justified for prophylactic, protective, or peaceful purpose, 
regardless of whether a biological sample is synthetic, occurs naturally, is infectious, or is a select agent.  
It is clear that in the U.S. the attention to bioterrorism and biosecurity seems to be higher than in Europe and 
it certainly derives from the Anthrax attacks that made the U.S. very afraid of the risk. Yet, a certain 
negligence in respecting the balance between security and health seems to be present in M.S.E.H.P.A.. It 
has been defined as a “draconian law”, as criminal sanctions are provided for people who refuse to stay in 
quarantine. This is on the basis of a written directive by a public health official where a person can be 
quarantined before a hearing must be held. However, there is a certain vagueness about standards for 
quarantine, thus allowing for the arbitrary use of force and the permitting of public health authorities to 
quarantine anyone who refuses to be examined or treated, for whatever reason
141
. In these provisions, a 
proper balance between public health needs and individual right to health (and refusal) is absent.  
In the U.K. a reference to the international lists of pathogens and biological agents is chosen, but there is an 
“open door” to the admissibility of synthetic agents as well. This is visible in the part of legislation where the 
Secretary of State is vested with the possibility to extend the list to include further pathogens or toxins if 
suspected of being used for bioterrorism.  
In Italy, no references to synthetic biology are made, except in the “Code of Conduct” promulgated by the 
National Committee for Biosafety, Biotechnology and Life Sciences. The Code recommends to monitor the 
production of substances obtained by a synthetic organisms if they are not equivalent to the known ones, 
and to forbid research on synthetic organisms when they can be covered by prohibitions that are stated in 
B.W.C.. Moreover, the drafting of guidelines by journals about publication of results of research that could be 
“dual use” should be boosted.  
In general, the measures of prevention, surveillance and response adopted both in the U.K. and in Italy 
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 5. DIFFERENT PROPOSALS FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF BIOSECURITY RISKS OF SYNTHETIC 
BIOLOGY. 
 
After considering the regulatory framework that has been enacted so far for the management of bioterrorism, 
its compatibility with the constitutional balance of rights and its applicability to the new challenge represented 
by synthetic biology, it is necessary now to consider whether specific frameworks of governance of 
biosecurity risk for synthetic biology have been proposed, and what they are. Up till this point, I have tried to 
check the application of the existing legislative framework about bioterrorism to synthetic biology, keeping in 
mind that it was not born for addressing the risk generated by synthetic biology. In this section, the focus will 
be put on those proposals which are drafted precisely for synthetic biology. 
 
 
5.1. THE INITIATIVE OF INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL PUBLISHERS. 
 
One of the first initiatives about biosecurity risks of synthetic biology is represented by the “Statement on 
Scientific Publication and Security”, enacted in 2003 by international journal publishers (i.e., the American 
Society for Microbiology and the editors of Science, Nature and Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the U.S.A.) warning that «there are occasions that an editor may conclude that the potential 
harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits»
142
, and in that case, the publication should be 
modified or not be published. The statement is a clear recognition of the fact that «journals and scientific 
societies can play an important role in encouraging investigators to communicate results of research in ways 
that maximize public benefits and minimize risks of misuse»
143
. So, the dual-use feature of life science 
research urges scientists to be careful of abuses and misuses, and it calls for the journal editors to exercise 
responsibility, when confronted with research papers that could be “sensitive” from the biosecurity 
standpoint. However, it should be noted here that the methods in which to recognise such “sensitive 
research” remain to be determined. 
 
 
5.2. THE U.S. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL AND NATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD FOR 
BIOSECURITY, AND THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS.  
 
 In 2003, the National Research Council which is not a government body, but can give recommendations to 
the Government, formed a Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive 
Application of Biotechnology. The committee enacted a report entitled “Biotechnology Research in an Age of 
Terrorism”, commonly called the “Fink Report” after the committee chairman, Dr. Gerald Fink
144
. 
The report outlines the steps that the U.S. government should take to prevent the misappropriation of 
legitimate biotechnologies by terrorists. However, it should be noted that it does not mention synthetic 
biology per se, but the reference to the development of biotechnology and the possibility of using it in a 
malevolent way allow for the interpretation that the recommendations can be referred to synthetic biology as 
well. In the report there are relevant recommendations for educating the scientific community about risks of 
“dual use”, the need of employing local institutional biosafety committees and of creating a new entity, 
namely the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (N.S.A.B.B.). The report further recommends 
that the scientific community continues to adopt a self-governance model for scientific publications and to 
look for a better means of communication between law enforcement and the scientific community. It also 
suggests the necessity for a set of codes of conduct for scientists. It underlines seven experiments of 
concern: (1) the demonstration how to render a vaccine ineffective, (2) the confer of resistance to antibiotics 
or antiviral agent, (3) the enhancement of the virulence of a pathogen, (4) the increase of transmissibility of a 
pathogen, (5) the alteration of a pathogen’s host range, (6) the enablement of evasion of diagnostic tools, 
and (7) the weaponization of a biological agent. The Committee also intervenes in the discussion about 
whether or not to publish some of the experiments that could entail potential misuse, and it urges for the 
prevention of «the destructive application of biotechnology research while still enabling legitimate research to 
be conducted». 
After the Fink Committee, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences set up the Committee on Advances in 
Technology and the Prevention of their Application to Next Generation Bioterrorism and Biological Warfare 
                                                          
142




 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, Committee on Research Standards 
and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology, Washington, U.S.A., 2004. 
 Threats, the so-called “Lemon-Relman Committee”, named after its two co-chairmen
145
. This Committee 
broadened the work of the “Fink Committee” in several directions, in particular putting the focus globally, and 
specifically referring to synthetic biology as a new source of threat for biosecurity. 
Then, the N.S.A.B.B. was established within the N.I.H. in 2004 in response to the “Fink Report”. It is 
composed of scientists and national security experts, governmental and non, with the role of advising 
institutional biosafety committees and recommending specific strategies for the oversight of potential dual-
use biological research, while taking into consideration both the national security concerns and the needs of 
the research community. More specifically, the N.S.A.B.B. is meant to advise on (1) the strategies for local 
and federal biosecurity oversight towards life sciences research, (2) the development of guidelines for 
biosecurity oversight, (3) strategies to work with journal editors and other stakeholders to ensure the 
development of guidelines for the publication, public presentation, and public communication of potentially 
sensitive life sciences research, and (4) the development of guidelines for mandatory programs for education 
and training in biosecurity issues. The N.S.A.B.B. usually indicates the scientists as the only judges for 
identifying the “sensitive research” of colleagues and for addressing conduct issues. 
Since 2006, one specific group is formed within N.S.A.B.B. that focuses specifically on synthetic biology, and 
it has enacted a report on biosecurity implications of de novo synthesis of select agents (2006), 
recommending: «(1) a specific definition of which sequences are covered by the Select Agents Registry, (2) 
a formal and consistent process for comparing synthesis orders to the registry by using software, and (3) the 
maintenance of records of orders for five years»
146
. 
In 2009 the National Security Council has published the “National Strategy for Countering Biological 
Threats”
147
, taking into account the evolution of synthetic biology and calling for government action in 
addressing new threats and responsible conduct, but without referring to specific federal actions.  
 
 
5.3. THE SCIENTIFIC ACADEMY’S AND SCIENTISTS’ INTERVENTION.  
 
Among the scientists, an important intervention is represented by the Inter Academy Panel (I.A.P.) on 
International Issues, i.e. a worldwide network of scientific academies. It drew up the “I.A.P. Statement on 
Biosecurity” at the end of 2005
148
. This statement gives the guidelines for the compilation of codes of 
conduct. Four principles are crucial: (1) awareness (i.e., making researchers aware of biosecurity risks in life 
sciences and new technologies), (2) Safety and Security (the necessity of indicating safety and security 
requirements for research activities), (3) Education and Information (to scientists), and (4) Accountability and 
Oversight (that is, researchers should signal abuses and supervise activities). 
From I.A.P. Statement, the International Union of Microbiological Societies (I.U.M.S.) and the International 
Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology (I.U.B.M.B.), respectively in 2005 and 2006, adopted their 
codes of conduct accordingly
149
. 
Single scientists, such as Michele S. Garfinkel and Robert M. Friedman (from The J. Craig Venter Institute), 
Drew Endy (from Massachusetts Institute of Technology), and Gerald L. Epstein (from the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies), have enacted the report “Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance” 
(2007)
150
, which has three targets: (a) gene synthesis firms, oligonucleotide manufacturers and DNA 
synthesizers, (b) owners of a laboratory that synthesise DNA, and (c) users or consumers of synthetic DNA 
and the institutions that support or oversee their work. The policy options that must be enacted in order to 
prevent incidents of bioterrorism consist of, for the first category of addressees, the screening and checking 
orders of synthetic DNA, then their certificating through a biosecurity responsible officer, and finally the 
proper storage of the records. Then, the owners of the DNA synthesizers must register their machines and 
be licensed. Finally, the legitimate users should incorporate education about the risks and the best practices 
as part of university curricula, follow biosafety manual and best practices in labs, increase responsibilities 
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 and oversight of Institutional Biosafety Committees. The authors of this report implicitly affirm the need for 
further regulation of the field. 
 
 
5.4. THE GOLDMAN SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY’S PROPOSAL AND THE DECLARATION OF CIVIL 
ORGANIZATIONS AT THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY (SB 
2.0). 
 
During the Second Conference about synthetic biology (2.0), taken at Berkeley in 2006, a White Paper 
written by Stephen Maurer et al. from the Goldman School of Public Policy (California) began to circulate
151
. 
It insisted that (1) commercial gene synthesis companies adopted the best-practice screening methods, (2) a 
list of software tools was drafted, (3) “experiments of concern” could obtain independent expert advice before 
proceeding, (4) members had an ethical obligation to report dangerous behaviours, (5) a clearinghouse for 
helping community to identify and respond to the biosafety/biosecurity implications was created, and (6) 
investments in biosafety and biosecurity measures should be taken. The document placed a lot of emphasis 
on the governance options for synthetic biology, which could be implemented through community self-
governance without outside intervention.  
Against this position, some civil organizations (E.T.C., for example) drafted a Declaration
152
, asking for 
stricter governance that did not allow the scientific community to govern by itself. In particular, the 
Declaration focuses on DNA synthesis that could give rise to safety or security concerns, and suggests the 
improvement of existing software tools for screening DNA sequences.  
 
 
5.5. THE DNA-SYNTHESIS COMPANIES’ CHOICES. 
 
The suppliers of synthetic DNA in the U.S.A. and Europe are several. In the 2000s, some of them started 
screening sequence orders voluntarily, but the procedure was not clear. For this reason, a few companies 
assembled for constituting an International Consortium for Polynucleotide Synthesis (I.C.P.S.)
153
, which 
elaborated on a DNA synthesis order screening process (2007), suggesting that (a) people who ordered 
DNA synthesis should identify themselves, their home organisation and all relevant biosafety information; (b) 
the single companies should use validated software tools to check synthesis orders; (c) the companies 
should work together through the I.C.P.S., and interface with appropriate government agencies (worldwide), 
in order to identify potentially dangerous sequences
154
. 
In the same time (2007), a group of German companies formed another consortium called the International 
Association of Synthetic Biology (I.A.S.B.)
155
. The Association has pushed for the development of guidelines, 
codes of conduct and best screening practices for scientific community. In its report “Technical Solutions for 
biosecurity in synthetic biology” (2008) about the First Meeting of the I.A.S.B., the importance of reaching 
these aims has been underlined:  
(1) Harmonization of screening strategies for DNA synthesis orders, realising a forum to discuss 
shortcomings and to share technical resources;  
(2) Creation of a central virulence factor database, i.e., a web-based, publicly  accessible database 
containing the annotated genomes of selected viruses, bacteria, pathogens; 
(3) Publication of an article on the status quo of synthetic biology; 
(4) Establishment of a technical biosecurity working group with members from the I.A.S.B. and the I.C.P.S., 
in order to discuss improvements and next steps for biosecurity measures, and 
(5) Commitment to security screening: each member, that already screens incoming gene orders for 
potential biosecurity risks and customers, should advertise these practices
156
. 
At the 2009 Second Meeting, a “Code of Conduct and Best Practices” has been drafted
157
, which stresses 
the importance of (a) public discussion, (b)distribution, (c) a review of the Code, (d) the necessity of 
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 screening all gene synthesis orders and the customers for ensuring the legitimacy of the order, (e) keeping 
the records (the positive and suspected ones are stored for 8 years), (f) avoiding the delivery to private 
addresses, (g) cooperating with authorities and the community, and (h) informing about orders indicating 
illegal procurement activities. When a potential pathogen is identified by a software, the order is reviewed by 
an expert and it can be accepted, or rejected. Potential customers are screened against available lists 
provided by state authorities. This Code is considered as binding to its I.A.S.B. signatories, but is also a 
guideline for non I.A.S.B. companies.  
In 2009, after the Second I.AS.B. meeting, five gene-synthesis companies (GENEART, DNA 2.0, Blue Heron 
Biotechnology, Integrated DNA Technologies and GenScript) decided to separate and form another group, called the 
International Gene Synthesis Consortium (I.G.S.C.), which is not open to all companies, but restricts 
membership to companies with more significant market shares. The Consortium has proposed lower 
requirements for sequence screening, by placing the emphasis on fast and cheap computerized checks 
against a predefined list of threats. Thus, the I.G.S.C. has enacted “Harmonized Screening Protocol”
158
, 
which opts for automated screening as a filter to identify pathogen and toxin DNA sequences.  
Both the I.A.S.B. and the I.G.S.C. codes involve an automated step, in which the genes in a customer’s 
order are compared against those from organisms on lists such as the U.S. Centre for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s “select agents” list. Although the I.A.S.B.’s standards specify that a human expert will follow up 
on possible “hits” identified in the automated screening step, the I.G.S.C.’s code ends with the automated 
screening step. Only when there is any suspicion of potential threat in the ordered sequence or in the 
customer’s identity, should the I.G.S.C. companies report the request to authorities. This system is simpler 
and less costly because it creates a list of genes and a threshold, under which orders are considered as 
dangerous and thus refused. The system, however, «worries some observers, because it is difficult to 
translate the list of select-agent organisms into lists of dangerous genes»
159
 and because the element of 
human screening is completely absent. 
 
 
5.6.  THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE VOLUNTARY 
SCREENING GUIDELINES FOR PROVIDERS OF SYNTHETIC DNA. 
 
In 2010, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (D.H.H.S.) released the “Screening Framework 
Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA”
160
. It refers to synthetic products, so that the 
order of them could be in line with S.A.R. and E.A.R.. The compliance with the Guidance is not compulsory 
but voluntary. The Guidance suggests that all double-stranded DNA orders are screened (“sequence 
screening”) against GenBank, the National Institutes of Health (N.I.H.) genetic sequence database, which is 
an annotated collection of all publicly available DNA sequences. When receiving an order for synthetic 
double-stranded DNA, providers perform also a “customer screening” (checking the identity and affiliation of 
the customer). If the customer is a suspected one (as indicated in lists of people forbidden of access) or the 
agent is a select one, a “follow-up screening” must be pursued, by controlling the certificates and asking for 
the purposes of the usage of the agent. If the “follow-up screening” does not resolve the concerns about the 
order, the U.S. Government or the F.B.I. or the C.D.C. should be contacted for further assistance. 
These Guidelines are voluntary, but they are meaningful, because they represent the first set of specific 
rules issued by a government with regards to synthetic biology, and they take into account the role of 
industries and scientific community as well. Thus, this guidance is a mix of government and self-regulation 
model of governance. 
 
 
6. SUGGESTION OF A NEW MODEL: A “PRUDENT VIGILANCE” APPROACH FOR MANAGING 
BIOSECURITY RISKS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY. 
 
As it has been established thus far, different models of governance have been suggested with reference to 
the risks of biosecurity in the field of synthetic biology
161
. However, each of them shows some gaps and 
missing points. So, a new model is needed. In my opinion, a proper “road” to follow, in order to govern this 
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 type of risks of synthetic biology, should be the so called “prudent vigilance” model. This expression is 
borrowed from the U.S. Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (P.C.S.B.I.)’s report on 
synthetic biology. In 2010, this advisory panel of the nation’s leaders in medicine, science, ethics, religion, 
law and engineering has adopted, on request of the President Obama, a report containing 18 
Recommendations for a proper governance and regulation of the field
162
.  
Developing the ideas contained within such report and taking some references from the International Risk 
Governance Council’s report and its guidelines about synthetic biology
163
, and from Innogen Centre 
Report
164
, my proposal consists of adopting a model, which has the following featyures: 
(1) From the point of view of its features: a model that consists of an ongoing and periodically revised 
assessment of biosecurity risks. It should be conducted with  the involvement of all the stakeholders 
(governments, industries, scientific community, researchers, consumers, and so on) in a flexible way, so as 
to take into account all the scientific, economic, social, political, and ethical aspects involved within 
biosecurity needs. The purpose must be to assume proportioned measures of governance, i.e., measures 
based on the principles of proportionality and reasonableness among rights, and thus finding a proper 
balance between rights and interests to protect, without sacrificing or suppressing any of them.  
Kelle, in this instance, suggests an approach that «(a) includes all stakeholders in the development of 
synthetic biology as a discipline and its potential future applications, and (b) is flexible enough to 
accommodate a range of scenarios of how the field might develop»
165
; 
(2) From the point of view of actors that have to be engaged and sources of law to adopt: this model opts for 
a mixed model of “hard law” and “soft law”, that integrate reciprocally. The institutions are not the sole actors, 
but the scientific community, the stakeholders and general public are involved as well in an “engagement” 
approach; 
(3) From the point of view of the enforcement, oversight and control of the policies that have been adopted: 
this model calls upon for the involvement of judges, government bodies, independent professional bodies, 
and multi-stakeholders’ bodies. These subjects should cooperate and integrate each other. The tools that 
could be used are case-law, administrative law, and an autonomous set of measures that are decided on the 
basis of “soft law”.  
Applying these general characteristics of the “prudent vigilance” model to the specific case of biosecurity 
risks, it results that the governance should be reached through an involvement of all the stakeholders. This is 
established through the “top down” and “bottom up” sources of law, and a mixture of instruments for the 
enforcement and control. This means that, on the one hand, single laboratories and the whole scientific 
community should be called to draft the guidelines and the codes of conduct
166
 (“soft law”), that are needed 
for increasing the awareness of risks posed by new technologies and for assigning to professionalization a 
tool for governance
167
. In this way, synthetic biologists are conceived as scientists having ethical obligations 
and deontological rules to follow. Indeed, the involvement of scientists «offers them an identity as ‘guardians 
of science’ in the fight against biological weapons and bioterrorism, rather than the passive recipients of 
bureaucratic regulations»
168
. The drafting of deontological codes and codes of conduct can also increase the 
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 trust of the general public on the scientific community
169




On the other hand, the intervention of the States and governments through “hard law” cannot be neglected. 
However, it must be meant to be complementary with the one of the scientific community, and it should 
consist in delineating the general rules to scientists (such as the introduction of licenses for dealing with 
products or the duty to keep the State informed of developed research). Governments could also have a role 
in the phase of control of the sources of risk coming from the outside and from the State itself (in particular, 
by means of a decision-making authority embodying both science and security values and composed of 
specialists in the field). 
Moreover, the engagement approach based on “prudent vigilance” entails that scientists are made aware of 
their responsibilities through programs for education and training that allow the creation of a “culture of 
responsibility”. Scientific publishers and journals are also involved in the process and are invited in drafting 
their rules, on the basis of general frameworks coming from governments and legislators. 
In this way, different levels of governance could be noted for addressing the biosecurity risks of synthetic 
biology:  
(a) the level of individual scientists (that are the target of education programmes and must respect the whole 
set of biosecurity rules); 
(b) the level of single laboratories (that are called to draft their own security guidelines, in line with the set of 
rules and standards adopted in the international and national frame); 
(c) the level of educational and research institutions (that must supply scientists with educational training and 
control the compliance with the security rules); 
(d) the level of scientific communities and/or organisations (that are called to settle their codes of conduct, 
respecting what provided in higher sources of law); 
(e) the level of science publishers (invited to establish their deontological rules (about publication or 
censorship of scientific researches that arise “dual use” concerns); 
(f) the level of national governments (that use laws, binding statutes, decrees for defining the regulation in 
biosecurity field); and 
(g) the level of international (governance) bodies, such as United Nations, B.W.C. Review Conferences, 
W.H.O., and other bodies dealing with biosecurity and called to set a harmonized and shared set of 
standards.  
So, the self-governance approach chosen by the “Fink Report”, by the “Lemon-Relman” report, by Garfinkel’s 
and Goldman School’s reports should be integrated by the “top down” intervention. Similarly, the approach 
that has been assumed by civil organizations at the Second International Conference (SB 2.0) consisting of 
supporting the external regulation should not deny the importance of the “bottom up” contribution. The 
options given by the I.A.S.B., the I.C.P.S. and the I.G.S.C. appear more balanced as seem in the focusing of 
their activities on the technical solutions to the problem of the potential misuse of DNA sequences, and the 
suggestion of codes of conduct and best practices, without excluding the role of government and external 
authorities for oversight and enforcement of these standards. Yet, as Kelle affirms, «although the proposals 
for technical solutions to DNA synthesis are certainly to be welcomed as useful building blocks for an 
overarching biosecurity governance structure, they do not represent an integrated approach that would, for a 
start, include a coherent set of measures to raise awareness across the synthetic-biology community»
171
. 
A mixed approach is the one chosen by the D.H.H.S. with the “Screening Framework Guidance for Providers 
of Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA”, and an openness in the same direction is given by National Security 
Council in its last report (2009). 
In a nutshell, a proper model for dealing with biosecurity risks of synthetic biology is the one characterized by 
an ongoing assessment of the risks and the involvement of all the actors and all the sources of law in the 
process, as well as the presentation of measures that range from ensuring the awareness of risks upon 
single scientists, to formulating laboratory guidelines, and from codes of conduct to national laws, and 
European and international provisions. 
For the moment, the results of such approach are visible only with regards to the technical issue of 
controlling the DNA sequence trade
172
. The screening of customer orders for potentially dangerous DNA 
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 For deepening the issue, see SAMUEL, Gabrielle / SELGELID, Michael / J., KERRIDGE, Ian, “Back to the future: Controlling 
synthetic life science trade in DNA sequences”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, No. 5, Vol. 66, 2010, pp. 9–20. 
 sequences, the limitation of sale of DNA sequences, the storage of records of orders are the most adopted 
measures. Indeed, at the international level the Australia Group has elaborated on a system of controls on 
the export of select biological agents belonging to the list. The U.S., the E.U. and national regulations offer 
rules about the export controls. The I.A.S.B. has enacted a code of conduct about screening of orders and 
the U.S. D.H.H.S. has drafted a set of guidance in the same regard. The level of single laboratories and 
researchers is not controllable, but it is wishful that similar rules could be enacted in line with such a multi-
level framework. 
 The applicability of this approach only to the control of DNA sequence trade shows how embryonic 
the multilevel governance model is. However, this example demonstrates that such approach can work. 
Therefore, what is necessary now is to implement it. This allows for the facing of the biosecurity risks of 
synthetic biology in a comprehensive way, both at the global and at the local level. 
Furthermore, moving to the phases of enforcement and control of the policies that have been adopted 
through “hard law” and “soft law”, through “top down” and “bottom up” sources and through the involvement 
of the public as well, it should be noted that the mixed model based on coordination and integration of tools 
should be applied in the case of biosecurity risks. It would entail that judges, government bodies, 
professional bodies which represent scientific community should intervene for the check of the respect of the 
rules that have been adopted. Moreover, such role of oversight should also be vested upon a multi-
stakeholders’ bodies that assemble people from all the different areas of the society, and thus representing 





Synthetic biology could be misused and could lead to bioterrorist scenarios, if handled by malevolent people, 
“lone operators” and biohackers. Thus, a set of regulations at the international, European, national level has 
been developed in the course of the years, not precisely with reference to synthetic biology, but in the fight 
against bioterrorism. However, provided that some modifications and updates are done to this set of 
regulations, while keeping in mind the constitutional frame that requires finding a balance between public 
health or security needs and the freedom of research, such system of rules could be applied to synthetic 
biology as well. The importance of governing biosecurity at a global level, as it is a global issue, is evident. 
For this reason, there is a need to accommodate to synthetic biology and to the constitutional frame that set 
of “hard law”, which has been presented in the first part of this chapter. However, a mere “hard law” system 
(“command and control” model
173
) is not sufficient for tackling with biosecurity needs. Indeed, the fact of 
assigning to the governments the role to fix rules onto a scientific community from the outside could be too 
costly to implement and too limiting to the development of scientific progress. For instance, if decisions about 
what research is to be done and what papers are published are left in the hands of bureaucrats and 
governments, they will probably make security prevail over science values
174
. Furthermore, a “command and 
control” system is «less effective where the target and scope of regulation are not easily defined. [...] [It is] 
also difficult to implement or enforce when the institutional behaviour to be influenced is complex, diffuse, 
and rapidly changing—all traits that characterize the diverse bioscience community»
175
. 
On the other side, if a “pure” self governance model is preferred, the opposite situation is likely to be 
generated, i.e., the situation of favour for an absolutely free research, without any limit. 
So, a proper balance between controlling research and letting it proceed can be rationally and adequately 
reached only through a new model of governance, in which governmental governance is applied in concert 
with other ways of governance. Taking in mind that «governance systems that rely on voluntary standards or 
institutional practices cannot, alone, guarantee the prevention of bioterrorism or protect against malignant 
uses of biology. But international treaties or national top-down regulation cannot, on their own, deliver such 
promises either»
176
, the solution is a convergence of multilevel sources and actors. The regulatory 
multiplicity
177
 and the co-presence of external regulation and codes of conduct, guidelines, deontological 
rules
178
 enacted by scientific community itself could determine a more complete regulatory and governance 
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 About the moral duties to be embedded within deontological codes for life scientists (such as the obligations to 
prevent bioterrorism; to engage in response activities; to consider negative implications of research; not to publish or 
 system, that appears as more suitable for balancing freedom of research and security needs. Such 
framework should assess and monitor in a constant way the developments of science and its risks. 
The implementation of “hard law” and “soft law” rules for countering bioterrorism would have to deal with (1) 
the level of scientific practice (security and safety rules for laboratories), (2) the level of information 
dissemination (giving external rules for publication and supporting the enactment of codes of conduct by 
journals and scientific editors), (3) the level of technology application (rules about the monitoring of all DNA 
synthesis orders from all suppliers in a coordinated way, the supplying people with a system of 
epidemiological surveillance and response in case of bioterrorist attack, the possession, trade and transfer of 
biological material), (4) the necessity of creating a culture of responsibility and cooperation between the 
scientific community and authorities
179
, (5) the need to make scientists aware of their responsibilities and the 
risks of their work, and finally (6) the boosting of the research on synthetic biology, and using it as a means 
for fighting against bioterrorist threats coming from itself (for instance, adopting synthetic biology for 
designing new ways of resistance to bioterrorism, such as new vaccines, drugs and anti-viral therapies 
against pathogens and biological agents)
180
.  
In addition, a mixed model for the oversight and control of those policies should be adopted. The cooperation 
and integration between different subjects seems the best way for enforcing those codes of conduct and for 
ensuring the application of international and national laws. In particular, bodies aimed at the oversight of the 
security rules and composed of government, security, scientific community members, and other stakeholders 
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